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Introduction
The role of water has featured prominently in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process,
and in Arab-Israeli disputes in general.  Increasing water scarcity continues to drive this
prominence. The allocation or reallocation of water rights is a particularly thorny problem, made
worse by the multiple levels of actors involved: subnational interest groups and constituents, as
well as national governments and other representative bodies.  Recent work (Fisher, 1995 in
particular) seeks to sidestep the issue of rights allocation by appealing to the Coase theorem in
economics, which provides conditions under which the efficient use of water does not depend on
the allocation of property rights.  This work instead focuses on estimating the use value of the
water in dispute, and finds that the estimate is relatively small.  The conclusion drawn from this
low number is that a trade of “water for peace”, or more generally, a resolution of the dispute
over water, should be eminently possible.  In this paper, we provide a critique of this conclusion.
Two ideas are central to our analysis.  First, the conditions of the Coase theorem are not
satisfied, even approximately, and therefore the valuation of the use of water cannot be
analytically separated from the allocation of property rights.  Second, the existence of subnational
interests, and the need to have an agreement acceptable to important actors at this level, creates a
further difficulty for negotiating a resolution of any dispute.  Even if a trade at the national level
can be agreed upon, domestic losers must be compensated enough to make it politically feasible
for the national government.No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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The structure of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, we review the empirical and
analytical issues, and the work of Fisher (1995).  Following that, we introduce our basic
arguments with respect to the Coase theorem.  Next, we further discuss the issue of water
markets as asset markets.  We argue that conceptualizing water markets in this way is crucial to
supporting institutions for efficient water allocation. We then discuss the two-level perspective
applied to bargaining over water.  Again, while we point out the difficulties created by the
existence of two (or more) levels of bargaining, we discuss how recognizing these difficulties,
rather than attempting to side step them, can help to provide a solution.  We conclude the paper
by drawing out some general implications of our analysis.
Can Economics Save Us from “Zero-sum Thinking”?
Increasing fears of “water shortages”, even of “water wars” have become commonplace
in discussions concerning the arid regions of the developing world. (For example, see The
Economist, 1995-96). Such fears are voiced often for South Asia and, especially, for the Middle
East. The role of water looms sufficiently large in Arab-Israeli disputes and peace negotiations to
warrant a special entire section of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty and to feature prominently
in all discussions of the future of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Conflict over water seems
to elicit deep fears and to provoke extreme public statements. There is widespread concern over
the ways in which conflict over water can and does aggravate already intractable struggles over
land, sovereignty, borders, and so forth.No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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In such a volatile, dangerous environment of conflict, it is perhaps natural that economists
have taken the lead in proposing increasing reliance on market allocation of water as a potential
solution to, at least, the conflict over water.  Economists, of course, believe that a “shortage” of
anything that is useful cannot be defined without reference to its price.  If shortages persist for an
extended period, economists always suspect that something is interfering with the price
mechanism.  The fact that it is quite evident that water is often used inefficiently — not enough
going to the user who values water the most, too much to those who value it less — adds to
economists’ suspicions that a pricing mechanism is absent or very weak. These considerations
lead to a call for institutional change, for the creation of water markets, markets which, it is often
argued, will both eliminate scarcities and greatly ameliorate conflict over water.
Such considerations are typically found in proposals for reform of water allocation policy at the
national level.  Policy reforms are complicated, of course, by the international dimension: rivers
and aquifers typically cross national boundaries, and this dimension provides the urgency of the
fears alluded to in the first paragraph.  Any national policy has to take into account issues of
transnational water
 sharing,
 and securing international agreements on water has been, to say the
least, difficult and elusive.  (See Putnam, 1988, and Richards and Singh, 1997, on two-level
games.)
Conceptually, there are perhaps three major positions on the principles by which property
rights to water could be allocated. These positions have been characterized elsewhere (Richards
1994; see also Barrett, 1994) as “Harmon, History, or Hobbes”.  “Harmon” refers to the Harmon
Doctrine, widely used in the U.S. West, in which the rights of those who own land at the sourceNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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of the water (e.g., where the rain falls, or upstream actors generally) take precedence over others.
 In the Middle East, such a position is often taken by Palestinians, who assert that “since the rain
falls on our roof, it belongs to us”.  The polar opposite doctrine, “History”, refers to the position
that the rights of historical users of water, wherever they may be located geographically, should
take precedence over others. Unsurprisingly, Israeli spokesmen often adopt such a position,
arguing that since they made the investments and developed the water systems, their rights
should come first.  Needless to say, these principles of Harmon and History are diametrically
opposed in many cases. Any choice between such principles seems to most outsiders inherently
arbitrary and a mere cloak for the interests of the respective parties.
The third allocation principle dispenses with any concept of prior rights to water. It
merely says that rights to water are what the interested parties agree to; the allocation of water
rights is the outcome of a negotiation, a bargain, in which, inevitably, relative strengths will
matter.  This is the “Hobbes” principle, which asserts that the only way to decide the allocation
over property rights is to “do a deal”.
The problem with the third principle is, of course, that there is more than enough
Hobbesian behavior in the region (and elsewhere!) already.  Trying to divide water rights, like
the allocation of any property right, is inherently a “zero-sum game”. More accurately, it is a
“pure conflict game”, where any increase in one player’s utility necessarily decreases the other
player’s.  This includes zero-sum games as a special case.  We will continue to use “zero-sum”
because the term is popular and captures the essence of the issue very starkly. The Middle East,No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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in particular, has had generations of experience with the consequences of viewing state relations
through a zero-sum lens.
In such doleful circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising that some analysts have
attempted to side step the thorny problem of assigning property rights to water.  To take a recent
prominent example, Franklin Fisher and his colleagues at MIT and Harvard have argued that it is
possible to by-pass the property right question by focusing instead on water use: “the question of
water ownership rights and the question of water usage are analytically independent and should
not be confused”.  On this assumption, they proceed to quantify the benefits of water use.  They
find that these annual benefits to the current users of water in the region are “small”: $110
million for 1995, rising to no more than $500 million per year by 2020 (Fisher, 1995, p. 379;
Berck and Lipow, 1994, had previously proposed a similar, but much smaller transfer, valued at
$10 million annually). They then conclude that with appropriate side-payments, it should be
relatively easy for the nations of the Mashreq to come to agreement on water sharing.  They
argue that all the fuss about water conflict and negotiations is, in effect, much ado about nothing.
For example, Fisher (1995) states, “the property rights issue – the question of who owns the
water – should not be nearly so difficult to resolve as is generally supposed”  (p. 381).  He does
go on to say, “Nor do we claim that the question of who owns the water is unimportant” (p. 381),
but later concludes “ownership rights are not, in fact, tremendously valuable” (p. 388).
The argument is understandable: if it is possible to break out of zero-sum thinking, then
any observer of the Middle East would be delighted.  The argument is ingenious: by looking
beyond the conflict over property rights, it tries to shift our focus onto water’s productivity inNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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agriculture, industry, and services, and its utility in consumption.  The argument is helpful: it
provides a significant attempt to quantify the value of water in dispute.  The authors are surely
right that if water’s value were perceived to be some $110 million annually, the chances of
conflict might be reduced.  There is little doubt that the paper has made a real contribution to the
debate on water allocation mechanisms in the region; it is unsurprising that the argument has
received so much attention.
However, the argument is also flawed in its most fundamental premise: it is not possible
to separate questions of water ownership rights from questions of water usage.  The questions
are, in fact, not analytically independent.  Economics does not offer a neat exit from the brutal
zero-sum world of determining an initial allocation of property rights.
1  Markets will not provide
a sword to cut that Gordian Knot. This paper elaborates the counter-argument: allocating
property rights and questions of water usage are inseparable.  The fundamental problem is that
the separation of use and property rights can only be done under certain conditions, and that these
conditions are unlikely to be met in the case of water, especially in the Middle East.
The message of our paper, however, is not purely negative.  Focusing on the importance
of property rights allows one to understand better how negotiation may achieve some kind of
allocation of rights, and how this may support, with appropriate regulation, reasonably
functioning water markets.  Here we will emphasize the importance of having the right
conceptual framework to set about managing negotiations and designing institutions to govern
markets.  We emphasize the importance of recognizing the asset nature of water, and the multiple
levels of users of water.No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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Why the Coase Theorem Does Not Apply to Water Issues
The Fisherian perspective (if we may so label it) is fundamentally a particular application
and interpretation of the Coase Theorem.  The Coase Theorem states that the efficient allocation
of resources is, in certain circumstances (to be elaborated below) independent of the initial
allocation of property rights.  The perspective also thinks of (potential or implicit) water markets
as spot (as opposed to asset) markets. For example, Fisher (1995) states, “ the transfers envisaged
in our work are only temporary ones.  We are not talking of a permanent sale of historic rights.
Rather, we envisage the sale of permits allowing some party other than the owner to use the
water for a limited time.” By contrast, we argue:
•   The presence of (often large) transactions costs makes it impossible to separate
questions of use from questions of the allocation of property rights, and
•   Water markets are better analyzed as asset, rather than pure spot, markets.
 
  Two consequences follow from these propositions:
•   There is no escaping the need to negotiate a division of property rights over water,
and this will be more difficult than postulated by the MIT/Harvard project.
Unfortunately (but unsurprisingly) Thomas Hobbes and his contracting perspective
are alive and well in the region.
•   Because water markets are really asset markets, there is no escaping the need for
certain kinds of public regulation.  In a transnational context, this prerequisiteNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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strongly suggests that transnational institutions can, indeed must, play a crucial role in
moving nations toward greater reliance on water markets.
2
 
  There are two necessary conditions for the Coase Theorem, which states that the
distribution of property rights will have no consequence for the allocation of resources, to hold:
•   “wealth effects” do not exist, and
•   there are no transactions costs.
Both wealth effects and transactions costs are ubiquitous in water allocations, nullifying
the utility of the Coase Theorem, and, therefore, the notion that water allocation mechanisms
which “finesse” the problem of property rights divisions exist.
Consider the first condition, the absence of wealth effects.  This requires that:
1)  given any two alternative decisions x and y, there is a specific amount of money, $z,
which would compensate a decision maker to switch from x to y, or from y to x;
2)  if the decision maker were given some additional amount of money, the amount
necessary to induce him/her to switch from x to y, or y to x, would remain the same
($z);
3)  the decision maker must have enough money to absorb the wealth reduction necessary
to pay for switching from the less preferred to the more preferred option (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992, p. 35).No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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One puzzle facing economists who analyze water in the Middle East (and elsewhere) is
the oft-heard statement by highly informed local experts that “our water is not for sale”.
Employees in US government agencies responsible for trying to further regional water
negotiations often bemoan the fact that “they (i.e., regional government officials) do not think of
water economically”.  We believe that such statements may reflect more than bargaining
positions, that they refer to the presence of wealth effects.  We believe that, when water markets
are conceived of as asset markets, regional actors’ statements on water may be seen as highly
rational statements — they simply reflect the presence of wealth effects.
Such a finding will come as no surprise to those familiar with the environmental economics
literature, where the distinction between "willingness to pay" and "willingness to accept" is
commonplace. "Willingness to pay", of course, assumes that one does not own the good; it is the
"buyer's price". It is, therefore, subject to the income constraint. By contrast, "willingness to accept"
is the "seller's price" or price which one is willing to accept to part with a property right. This price
is not income constrained. Unsurprisingly, empirical studies have found that willingness to accept
exceeds willingness to pay; a standard survey of the literature (Bromley, 1995) finds that
willingness to accept is on average three times greater than willingness to pay.
Such divergence between willingness to pay and willingness to accept--and, therefore, the
impossibility of "finessing" the question of the original allocation of property rights--may have an
additional source as well. If agents behave according to the logic of prospect theory or loss
aversion, in which "the response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains" (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1990, p. 67), then agents' willingness to pay, for what they do not own, will be less thanNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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what they must be paid, to give up what they do own. (For a review of the evidence and additional
argument on this point, see Tversky and Kahneman, 1990). The presence of income effects,
together with the likely presence of loss aversion, helps to explain why so many agents throughout
the world say, "Our water is not for sale" -- property rights matter.
Further, such statements also reflect the presence of (very large) transactions costs.
Although there are many of these, we focus on two related issues: the role of uncertainty,
particularly uncertainty with respect to enforcement of contracts, and the problems of making
credible commitments (see below).  Regional actors often do not believe that the sums that they
would require to part with water would actually be paid.  Put in financial language, the risk
premia on such contracts are very high.  Once these risk premia are incorporated into the price of
the transfer, the amount may become so high that the scope for a transfer no longer exists: the
incentive for following through on the commitment may itself be adversely affected. In other
words, there is a moral hazard problem: this kind of argument is detailed in the case of credit
markets in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
A related uncertainty and transaction cost arises from the problem of enforcing contracts.
Not only is enforcing contracts not costless, but also the cost of enforcement may appear to
potential market actors as prohibitive or unattainable.  If a country (e.g., the Palestinian
Authority) does not own a) residual decision-making rights and b) residual rights to the income
stream generated by the utilization of the asset, then such a country is faced with very large
uncertainty on the other party (e.g., Israel) reneging on the contract.  In the international context,No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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this problem of enforcement is well recognized: Barrett (1994) highlights it for the case of water
agreements.  We next discuss this issue of uncertainty further.
Willingness to enter into any contract requires that agents have an answer to the
fundamental contracting question, “How do I know that the other party will keep his/her side of
the bargain?” There are three broad classes of answer to this question, only one of which is even
remotely apposite in Middle Eastern water questions:
1) “Because if they renege, I can take them to court”. A host of questions arise. What
court? Which court? Most fundamentally, whose court? Using which set of rules? Enforced by
whom? Their government?  Our government?  A third party?  Who are they?  These questions
have no easy answers in general situations involving sovereign nations.  In the Middle East, the
history of mistrust exacerbates the difficulties.
2) “Because we are in a repeated game, and they value their reputation as someone who
complies with agreements”. It would be difficult to imagine a historical-political setting in which
the respective “reputations” of the parties were more tarnished in the eyes of the other (the only
thing that “reputation” means in this context) than in the Mashreq. The mutual suspicion, often
amply justified, of each party for all the others is enormous. Reputation mechanisms seem highly
unlikely to help answer the fundamental contracting question.
3) “Because if they renege, they will lose other things which they value highly”.  This
reflects the often noted phenomenon that water agreements are typically “the tail of the dog”, thatNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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they are arrived at only after, and as part of, more general strategic agreements (e.g., Israeli-
Jordanian Peace Agreement).  From a theoretical (and practical!) perspective, the fact that
military security, the quintessential public good, must be introduced to get an answer to the
fundamental contracting question immediately alerts us to the inapplicability of the Coase
Theorem in transnational water systems.  The inseparability of property rights division and
resource allocation, and the importance of subnational interests in national level transfers must be
centrally addressed.
Whatever the answer to question of how contracts are enforced, water contracts are
inevitably subject to uncertain contingencies. There may be a severe drought; there may be
outbreaks of crop diseases; the prices of imported foods may suddenly rise, and so on.  It is
highly likely that, in an environment of profound distrust, the subjective probability of the
occurrence of negative shocks is an increasing function of the extent to which water supply
sources are owned/controlled by (deeply distrusted) foreigners. And, of course, even if one
considers insurance for such contingencies, then we introduce another version of the moral
hazard problem discussed above in the context of enforceability.  This problem of uncertainty is
assumed away in the Harvard/Fisher project, which uses a steady-state model, assuming all years
are average years.  The nature of water as a necessity, as well as the substantial complementary
investments that may accompany its use, imply that small reductions in available quantities can
push up marginal valuations dramatically.  The use of average availabilities ignores this
significant issue. The importance of this problem may be illustrated by one of the most
significant and longest-running international river disputes, over sharing the waters of the Ganges
between India and Bangladesh.  The absolute center of that dispute is the sharing of dry seasonNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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flows, which can be precariously low in abnormally dry years: see Crow et al (1995) and Crow
and Singh (2000).  Berck and Lipow (1994) tackle this sort of issue through prioritized rights --
we discuss this in the next section.
In short, the Coase Theorem does not, and cannot, hold for transnational water
agreements, and therefore, for transnational water markets. It follows that, unfortunate although
this fact is, we cannot legitimately separate questions of the distribution of property rights over
water from questions of the allocative efficiency of water.  There is no “Alexandrine sword” to
cut the Gordian Knot of Middle Eastern water conflicts.
Water Markets as Asset Markets
Part of the problem with applying the Coase Theorem is that transnational (and other)
water markets are typically conceived of as spot commodity markets—the simple markets of
Economics 101. By contrast, we believe that water markets bear a much closer resemblance to
asset markets. Such a perspective draws our attention to the need for public authority, regulation,
and all the other basically political issues that the “Harvard/Fisher Approach”, while
acknowledging them, seeks to finesse.
To understand the danger of focusing purely on spot transactions, consider the status of
markets for groundwater in India.  These are sometimes viewed as increasing the efficiency of
the use of water, since individuals with low marginal values can sell to those with higherNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
15
marginal values.  However, there is no prior allocation of water rights in such cases, and
ownership is simply de facto, through the use of pumps.  The overall use of water, therefore, does
not necessarily reflect its true scarcity value.
Groundwater is easily understood as a resource stock, and therefore as an asset. However,
it may seem less satisfactory to treat river water as an asset, since it is a physical flow rather than
a physical stock, unless it is dammed or otherwise stored.  After all, spot markets are markets for
flows of benefits per unit of time, while asset markets are markets for stocks.  Nevertheless, from
an economic perspective, water markets are better viewed as asset markets for rights, as well as
spot markets for temporary use of those rights.  Even for the flowing river, the right to draw on
that water year after year is what ultimately matters. That annual right to the physical flow of the
river constitutes an asset. We expand on this idea below.
Simply stated, asset markets are markets for implicit or explicit long-term contracts. I buy
the stock of the asset because it yields a flow of benefits over time. If I buy the stock — rights to
the stream of benefits — rather than buying the flow (through renting the stock), it is because I
think there is some advantage to doing so.  As recent theories of industrial organization (e.g.,
Williamson, 1975, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) teach us, the fundamental reasons for a
firm to own a resource (entering the asset market) as opposed to renting it (entering the spot
market) has to do with the presence of significant uncertainties and information costs (or, more
broadly, with transactions costs).  With long-term contracts (or asset markets), we must
immediately face the issue of uncertainty and imperfect information with respect to (among other
issues):No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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•   future “states of the world”—and, therefore, the problem of necessarily incomplete
contracts;
•   future enforceability of contracts (see section III);
•   problems in determining the future quality of the asset (problems of adverse selection;
problems of water pollution).
A further complication is as follows.  To use water, to derive utility from purchased (say)
water rights, I typically must also invest in complementary infrastructure.  Nearly all water
consumers consume water as conveyed to them through pipes and canals, and in the case of urban
users, after having been treated in large plants.  These are large, lumpy assets, which require
costs now, to reap benefits later.  The benefits from such infrastructure will only justify the costs
if I can overcome the problems of uncertainty.  Such investments, once made, are irreversible.  If
the benefits to be derived from such investments are to justify such investment, then I must be
able to overcome the problems of uncertainty and enforcement of contracts.  My question
becomes, “How can I protect my investment in infrastructure?   That is, how can I ensure that
they will deliver water as agreed?” As we have seen, in a world of deeply distrustful sovereign
states as actors, there is no simple answer to this question.
The necessity of large, indivisible complementary assets in enjoying the benefits of water
is what makes the asset dimension of water markets so significant.  No one can buy land, or build
dams or pipes, without some long-term guarantee of water availability.  A homeowner in an
industrialized nation’s city may confidently expect to be able to receive household water withoutNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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signing a long-term contract for its delivery.  Well-established local governments and courts back
up this expectation.  In a less certain situation, a long-term contract may be enough: say the city
contracts with the owner of a far-off source of water for delivery of a fixed amount per year for
30 years. Again, courts and state governments exist to support this arrangement.  In a still less
certain situation, where availability is uncertain, needs are uncertain, and enforcement is
uncertain, the only alternative may be outright ownership.  Then water, though divisible over
time and at a point in time, becomes like an indivisible asset.
It may be noted parenthetically that such a consideration needs to be applied to the Fisher
et al calculation of the “small” value ($110 to $500 million per year) of the benefits of water in
the Mashreq.  If such benefits are viewed as a stream extending into the indefinite future (i.e., as
a perpetuity), then the present value of such benefits discounted at, say, 5% is about $3 billion.
3
Although this may seem “small” compared to the size of the Israeli economy’s GDP of some $95
billion, it is not small compared to that of Jordan’s ($6 billion) or Syria’s ($17 billion), much less
the much smaller GDP of the Palestinian Authority. Of course this involves comparing a stream
of future benefits with the value of one year’s economic activity.  However, lumpy investments
do show up in a single year’s GDP.  For example, Fisher (1995) compares annual benefits with
the (capital cost) of military equipment (p. 386).  Perhaps the most important comparison is
between the size of the estimated yearly benefits and the Palestinian Authority’s GDP, in which
case the benefits are clearly large relative to the economy.No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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The importance of these issues of relative size is further highlighted when one examines
the Fisher proposal further.  This appears not to involve transfers of ownership rights at all,
beyond an establishment, based on history, of what these rights are.  Indeed:
[T]he transfers envisaged in our work are only temporary ones.  We are not
talking of a permanent sale of historic rights.  Rather, we envisage the sale of permits
allowing some party other than the owner to use water for a limited time.  As with all
voluntary trades, such permit sales will benefit both buyer and seller. (p. 382)
In this world, spot prices and quantities will keep adjusting, helped along by the project model,
which will provide “a guide in setting prices” as well as forecast future prices.  If a political
entity does not wish to sell such temporary permits, then “it has placed too low a value on the
water, and the price should be adjusted upwards.” If we are interpreting this correctly, Israel will
continue to hold “historic” ownership rights, and the Palestinians will have to pay what the
model suggests for additional water -- unless, of course, the Israelis want more than that.
The problem just highlighted is not simply one of prior bargaining power.  The presence
of lumpy, fixed investment as a necessary component of water markets immediately creates what
the literature on the economics of the firm calls “the hold-up problem”. This is a form of the
“incomplete contracting problem” which plagues asset markets, and becomes particularly acute
when alternative suppliers are not readily available. Once I have invested in infrastructure, what
is to prevent my (despised and distrusted) contracting partner from taking advantage of my sunk
costs to renege on his original agreement, and try to strike a still tougher bargain? The only ways
out here are ownership of the complementary asset, in this case the water, or competition in theNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
19
supply of that asset -- somewhat easier to envisage for manufacturing firms than for the political
entities of the Mashreq.
Considerations of risk and lack of substitutability suggest that water markets are likely to
be “thin” markets.  Furthermore, water rights may be usefully thought of as “idiosyncratic
rights”: rights to highly geographically specific commodities—it is not usually possible to find
other sources of water for a system of canals, pipes etc. than the one stream or river which feeds
into it. This suggests that the housing market may be an appropriate analogy for water markets. 
Here, too, idiosyncratic, often thin, asset markets display a number of imperfections thanks to the
presence of uncertainty and the impossibility of writing and enforcing contracts to cover all
possible future states of the world.  In theory, as in practice in the housing market
4, one could
deal with the problems of financing such investments through mortgage lending.  In the U.S,
interestingly, formerly highly fragmented mortgage markets did, indeed, give rise to a wide
variety of imperfections, and were accordingly subject to a wide variety of government
regulations. More recently, financial innovations have occurred which pool risks (i.e., mortgage
backed securities), and are then resold in a secondary market. That is, the idiosyncrasies of the
housing market are transformed by creating a financial market.  Perhaps water markets would
require something similar.
Note, however, that regardless of whether the idiosyncratic water market (that is,
potential market) is viewed as an “old style” mortgage market—with its fragmentation and “thin-
ness”, or as more modern “mortgage backed security market”, the need for regulation, for public
action, for governmental authority, and, in a transnational contest, for a negotiated agreement isNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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essential.  Whether direct (thin, idiosyncratic) markets or financial markets are required, or both
the need for regulation and public oversight in the presence of widespread uncertainty and
contract enforcement problems is inescapable.  The role of such regulatory bodies (water
registries, water councils, and watershed authorities) can be to resolve information problems such
as monitoring quantity and quality, and to provide mechanisms for cost-effective dispute
resolution. For example, Holden and Thobani (1996), in reviewing the experience with tradable
water rights, discuss a public Water Rights Registry, specifying “the flow or volume...; the point
at which the water will be diverted; whether it is for consumptive or non-consumptive use and
whether it is for permanent or temporary use; the point and form in which the water will be
returned to the river system; and the amount paid for the rights.”  See also Rios Brehm and
Quiroz (1995) and Gazmuri Schleyer and Rosegrant (1996). More broadly, the regulator sets and
enforces the rules of the game, as is invariably the case with well-functioning asset markets.
Once again, however, the implication is that there is no escaping the admittedly difficult, nasty
problem of allocating property rights, and of creating either transnational or bilateral agreements
over such rights.
How might property rights be assigned in practice, particularly given the problem of
uncertain total availability?  Berck and Lipow (1994) suggest an approach based on prioritized
rights, also in the context of the Middle East. These are rights ranked on the basis of priority, so
that lower-ranked rights can only be exercised once higher-ranked rights have been satisfied.
Note that these are permanent asset-based rights, which may be sold or leased.  The analogy with
financial assets such as preferred and common stock is straightforward.  In fact, Berck and Lipow
demonstrate that prioritized rights that are fully vested and fully tradable can span the same spaceNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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as a full set of state contingent claims, hence achieving Pareto optimality in a theoretical model.
Zeitouni, Becker and Shechter (1994) also propose priority claims, with two difference from
Berck and Lipow.  First, they make their proposal in the context of transnational markets for
water.  Second, they propose a specific institutional mechanism, namely sealed-bid auctions, for
implementing the market.  Zeitouni et al appear to propose a de novo allocation of rights through
auctions by a hypothetical “international water bank”.  They admit that they “largely disregard
important institutional and political aspects of the problem”.
Berck and Lipow note the well-recognized fact that existing policies in Israel and the
‘Disputed Territories’ are not characterized by efficient water contracts, being driven instead by
strategic and domestic political objectives. Therefore they also advocate reforms in pricing of
water, reduction or removal of distortionary regulation of agriculture, and the depoliticization of
needed water regulatory authorities by separation from ministries.  Issues of compensation of
losers from transfers, and the actual working of the regulatory bodies are not really addressed.
Hence, while they provide a more sophisticated and complete conceptual analysis than Fisher,
they do not fully come to grips with the issues raised here.  Clearly, however, water markets for
leasing and selling rights are more workable at the microeconomic level. Many papers have
articulated this case, and discussed the problems of the actual workings of water markets in
countries such as Chile and Mexico.  A particularly clear analysis is that of Holden and Thobani
(1996), which also references much of the other work in this area. As we shall argue in the next
section, the focus on microeconomic mechanisms is a sensible step towards solving transnational
conflicts.No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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The Perspective of Two Level Games
In our view, managing water scarcity will require two fundamental changes: domestic
economic policies will have to be reformed to rationalize water use (see World Bank, 1993, for a
summary of many of the Bank’s arguments in support of this proposition), and transnational
agreements on water sharing must be forged.
5  Each of these problems is difficult enough by
itself. However, they are intimately interrelated. In effect, each national government is engaged in
a “two-level game” (Putnam, 1988; Iida, 1993; Lax and Sebenius, 1991; Mayer, 1992; Mo, 1995;
Richards and Singh, 1997). Each government is simultaneously trying to reform its domestic
water regime while also negotiating with its neighbors over how to share the river’s resources.
But a move in one game will typically have implications for the outcome of the other.
International water negotiators are looking over their shoulders at domestic political conflicts
over economic reform, while advocates and opponents of economic reform monitor international
developments for its domestic implications.
There are numerous examples of such two-level games over water.  In the example that is
the main focus of this paper, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian National Authority are
negotiating (or have negotiated) over sharing the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, as well as mountain
aquifers. Simultaneously, Israel and Jordan each face issues of reallocating water between urban
and rural users internally (Just, Netanyahu and Horowitz, 1996). The Colorado River has been
the subject of negotiations between the United States and Mexico, as well as among the riparian
states in the US (Friedkin (1987); Ramana (1992), pp. 68-69). Sharing the waters of the GangesNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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river has been a point of contention between India and Bangladesh for several decades, while
both countries have had to devise schemes for apportioning their own shares among different
user groups and/or regions (Crow, et al, 1995; Chaudry and Siddigi, 1987); National Water
Development Agency, 1992). The Indus and its tributaries became the focus of intense bargaining
between India and Pakistan after India’s partition in 1947.  Simultaneously, India has had to
allocate its share of water from this basin to several different states (Barrett, 1994; Dhillon,
1983).
In the above examples, there are often more than two players at the subnational level. As
a first approximation, however one can sometimes focus on only two groups within a country.
One may think of this as “urban” versus “agricultural” interests; in fact, the interests of these
groups are often in conflict. For example, the city of Amman faces increasingly serious water
shortages while farmers in the (irrigated) Jordan Valley enjoy substantial subsidies to grow
water-intensive crops such as bananas, in which Jordan has no comparative advantage.
Alternatively, we may think of the groups as political entities, e.g., the states of Punjab and
Haryana in India.
Some examples of the problems created by the existence of two levels of bargaining may
be noted:
1) Water rights are traded for peace. This is fine, in principle – but, as noted in section III,
this introduces a public good, and therefore, free rider problems.  How is this public goodNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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produced?  How is it paid for?  How is this agreement struck, and enforced?  This public good
problem would not arise if nations were unitary actors, rather than collections of individuals.
2) It is not true, of course, that the current situation is devoid of property rights. Instead,
we have a de facto allocation of rights, which (at least) one party/nation does not accept. The
presence of de facto rights means that holders of those rights are now reaping rents from such de
facto ownership. In the presence of the problems noted above, how are they to be persuaded to
relinquish these rights?
We tackle some of the issues raised by the existence of two levels of bargaining in related
work (Richards and Singh, 1997).  There we examine several alternative (simultaneous and
sequential) cooperative bargaining structures (see Harsanyi, 1963, 1977 for an exposition of this
framework), and derive some equivalence results and welfare comparisons.  Taken together, our
results provide a demonstration of why there is often disagreement not only over water, but even
over how to negotiate about water.  Different institutional arrangements for negotiations can have
very different consequences for different actors.  A key feature in our framework is that being
able to commit to domestic negotiations can improve the bargaining position at the international
level. Theoretically, this works through domestic agreement improving the threat point of the
international negotiations.
Of course, this is not the only possible consequence of domestic politics for international
bargaining. Most obviously, strong domestic farm lobbies may make it more difficult for a
national government to make concessions. The argument that “our hands are tied” is often quiteNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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useful in negotiations, (e.g., Schelling, 1960). Alternatively, an unfinished international water
negotiation may retard domestic reform, as the negotiating parties fear that any domestic water-
savings achieved through reform will reduce their ability to claim a larger share of international
water. One obstacle to reform of domestic Jordanian water policy before the peace treaty with
Israel was precisely the fear by some Jordanian officials that greater efficiency in Jordanian
domestic water use would be seized upon by Israeli negotiators, who would argue that Jordan
“needed less water”.
In our (1997) analysis, we also discuss the possibility of complementary, productive
investments, undertaken noncooperatively.  As noted earlier, water by itself rarely gives utility; it
must be stored, moved, channeled, pumped, and piped to be useful.  Investments that enhance the
utility of water may be local, national, or international.  We focus on the impact of national
investment on water negotiations.  We offer three propositions in this extension of our basic
model.  First, the optimal allocation of water in one country will depend on domestic investment
in the other country, even in the absence of direct externalities, as long as such investment affects
the marginal utility of water.  Second, if domestic investment affects the marginal utility of
water, then, even in the absence of direct externalities, negotiating only over water, and not over
domestic investments leads to an inefficient outcome if domestic investments can be
precommitted.  Finally, whether or not domestic investments can be precommitted before
internal negotiations, if they take place after international negotiations, then, in the absence of
direct externalities, the outcome in terms of water allocation and domestic investments is
efficient.  Taken together, these results further illustrate the complications caused by two levels
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The analysis is further complicated when one allows for domestic noncooperative
bargaining over the gains and losses associated with international agreements: political lobbying
games may be such that efficient agreements are unreachable (see Grossman and Helpman,
1995a, b).  Even if water markets work, the political markets that would determine the initial
conditions for the operation of water markets may not.  And only political processes can manage
issues of the distribution of the costs of a public good, or the allocation of property rights.  Again,
questions of use and questions of the allocation of property rights can not be separated.
Do all the complications outlined above mean that no progress can be made?  Fortunately,
our answer to this question is ‘no’: our analysis focuses attention on the subnational issues that
must be resolved before transnational schemes such as the proposals of Fisher, Zeitouni et al, or
other variants can be considered in a practical manner.  We have already emphasized the
importance of establishing water rights.  We would argue that this cannot be properly done at the
national level, but must be first implemented at subnational levels.  This allocation of rights does
not have to mean individual rights – though some form of individual rights is likely to be
necessary in places where family farming is the rule.  Instead, they may be corporate rights,
vested in water user associations or variants of that organizational form.  The reason for
suggesting corporate rights is, of course, the problem of asset indivisibility that is characteristic
of complementary assets for water use, already discussed in section IV (see also Grossman and
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This leaves the question of how these rights are to be initially assigned.  This problem
appears to be sidestepped by all the authors we have referenced here, and we have highlighted the
difficult problem of “zero-sum thinking” that motivate that sidestepping.  One possible way out
of this problem is to try to connect the initial non-cooperative game of rights allocation to the
subsequent cooperative game of bargaining over the gains from trade.  This is in stark contrast to
the approach by Fisher, which seeks to separate the two issues.
The approach we have in mind is that of Bliss and Nalebuff (1984), introduced in the
context of a model where there are several individuals with private knowledge of the costs of
providing a public good.  A single individual can alone provide the public good, but may wait to
see if someone else will do so, avoiding his own cost.  Against this benefit of waiting (some
chance of saving the cost of provision) is the cost of waiting, since the benefits of the public good
are forgone until someone steps up to pay.  Technically, this game is a war of attrition with
incomplete information.  Alesina and Drazen (1991) adapt this model to one where the benefit is
not a pure public good, but rather is some fixed proportion of a gain from stabilization policy,
and where the costs are borne until the stabilization is undertaken.  Stabilization occurs only
when one party gives in to the other, accepting a lower fraction of the gains.
These models have two applications to our current concerns.  First, the Bliss and Nalebuff
analysis is directly relevant to the “water for peace” argument, where we have noted that the
usual way of posing this solution ignores the subnational level and therefore the problem of who
pays for the public good of peace.  If the transnational agreement is ratified, then the subsequent
subnational game becomes one of pure conflict.  However, if the subnational actors play a gameNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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where some subset (not necessarily a single individual or group) steps in to pay the cost -- in this
case by giving up water -- then it is very similar to the Bliss and Nalebuff war of attrition.  A
similar analysis would predict that an agreement could be reached where those for whom the
costs of giving up water use are the lowest will agree to do so after some delay. Of course the net
gains to each group must be positive.
The Alesina and Drazen analysis provides a similar insight into thinking about the general
problem of allocating domestic property rights.  This allocation will inevitably be a reallocation
and “firming up” of uncertain de facto rights.  This firming up of rights permits trading of rights,
value-enhancing investments, and other actions that might not be possible with uncertain de facto
rights, creating a potential benefit that is tied to the agreement.  Alesina and Drazen have shown
that, in their model, the delay in agreement goes down, as the sharing of the benefits of
stabilization becomes more equal.  The interesting conclusion for negotiations over water rights
is that the net benefits of such an agreement may need to be relatively equal to support early
“agreement” (i.e., concession by one side to the other). Again, as in the public good example
above, the weaker criterion that net benefits to all domestic groups involved in bargaining must be
positive is necessary for any agreement at all.  In any case, the reason a concession is made is that
the conceding party, while giving up some claims or de facto rights, gains in other well-defined
ways such as trade or investment in water.  Recognizing and working with the connection
between the two aspects is the opposite of the Fisher/Coase approach.No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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Where Do We Go From Here?
If there is no easy exit, do the parties to water disputes such as that in the Mashreq have
anywhere to go?  Let us briefly recapitulate our arguments before summarizing our suggestions
for where possible answers may be found. First, valuing the water in dispute independently of a
consideration of who owns the water is of limited analytical and practical use.  In fact, the
situation is not one where the theoretical conditions are met that would unambiguously allow
such a valuation.  Second, the value of water in dispute is not small relative to particular parties
to the dispute, whether entities such as the Palestinian Authority or groups living within a
particular country.  Third, the problem of negotiation at the international level is complicated by
the need to compensate losers at the subnational level – the two-level game problem. To relate
this to the second point, $100 million dollars may be a small amount relative to Israeli GDP, but
a large transfer to make to a group of farmers via the domestic political process. Fourth, the
assignment of property rights remains a zero-sum game, unless it can be inextricably tied to other
issues in the negotiation: the potential loser in the property rights assignment always has an
incentive to separate out the water issue from other issues in the negotiation. An outside party
with interests in a settlement may attempt to force the linkage, or it may offer conditional bribes
to achieve this end. Fifth, even if the property rights assignment can be made, the construction
and operation of markets for water is not a simple task, due to the nature of the good: in fact this
potential difficulty with water markets makes it more difficult to reach an agreement on property
rights.No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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Given these problems, where do we go, beyond the project-evaluation type valuation
provided by Fisher’s team?  A two-pronged approach is called for, dealing with the working of
markets and the allocation of property rights.  As we have emphasized, these are interrelated.
•   Thinking of water markets as asset, rather than pure spot, markets emphasizes the need
for regulation.  Unlike in the case of financial markets, much of this regulation need not
be at the national level, because the potential market is not national.  Some regulation
must be at the local level, reflecting local knowledge and conditions. Other regulation
must be at the level of domestic river basins. In fact, one can envisage a hierarchy of
regulation, following assignment principles such as those used in thinking about the
proper assignment of authority in a federal system.  Furthermore, given the role of
complementary assets in the delivery of the services of water, it should be recognized
that ownership need not be individualistic.  Firms, after all, are associations of assets
with multiple owners.  We may think of water associations as ownership associations,
rather than as just user associations.  Higher-level regulation then specifies the broad
terms of governance structures, disclosure rules, bankruptcy rules, etc.  In brief, markets
will work if institutional structures are in place to support their working.
 
•   The solution to the property rights issue requires an understanding of the bargaining
process.  In particular, the building of institutional structures for the functioning of water
markets may be made a part of this process.  Certainly the gains and losses to subnational
groups must be considered in the process of international negotiation, and this may affect
bargaining protocols.  Adding issues complicates the bargaining process, however, andNo Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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this, too, must be recognized.  Zero-sum games in fact do have Nash equilibria, and this
must be understood if the desire is to move from one equilibrium to another, better one,
or to create a new equilibrium by changing the game.No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water Alan Richards and Nirvikar Singh September 2000
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1Fisher (1995) is, of course, more optimistic: “In the case of Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian entity, the value of the
property rights at issue is small enough that it should prove possible to settle the issue in the context of a general
peace agreement.” (p. 381).  Two paragraphs later, however, he states, “Note that we do not offer a specific solution
for the issue of who owns the water”.  He goes on to focus on the value of water, independent of property rights.  Our
argument in this paper takes issue with the approach embodied in these quotes.
 
2 Fisher (1995) does envisage “a water authority jointly operated by (at least) Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian
entity” for monitoring compliance and “rational joint management of the water resources of the region” after
ownership rights are established.  We discuss this vision in the next section.
3This calculation is based on Fisher’s figure of $110 million in 1995, growing at a constant rate to $500 million in
2020.
4 The housing market in India provides an example of the importance of understanding the nature of property rights
to assets and of asset markets.  Severe rent controls and other laws designed to protect tenants have not only distorted
the rental market for housing, but also the markets for ownership and new construction. 
5 Besides the work of Fisher, there are several other studies in the context of the Middle East, particularly Zeitouni,
Becker and Shechter (1994) and Dinar and Wolf (1994a, b).  While Fisher proposes joint management with model-
determined transfers and prices, Zeitouni et al propose auction markets for priority claims.  Dinar and Wolf
explicitly introduce political concerns, using the tools of cooperative game theory (the Shapley value) to propose
reallocations of water.